Abstract: I object to Markos Valaris's thesis that reasoning requires a belief that your conclusion follows from your premisses. My counter-examples highlight the important but neglected role of suppositional reasoning in the basis of so much of what we know.
Markos Valaris defends this thesis: in order for you to genuinely reason from believed premiss(es) R to a conclusion p, you need to also believe that your conclusion, p, follows from your premiss(es), R. Valaris is also open to a slightly weaker thesis where you only need be disposed to believe p follows from R (believing it if you consider the matter). Valaris defines his use of 'follows' thus: 'p follows from R … just in case R constitutes conclusive evidence for p, i.e. just in case R justifies outright belief in-and potentially knowledge of-p.' (p.2; page references are to the Advanced Access online publication; doi: 10.1093/mind/fzu045) Valaris's main concern is to resist regress arguments for blind reasoning. By 'blind reasoning', I mean reasoning that does not involve your having any belief that your reasoning's conclusion follows from your basis (see Valaris, p.25; also Boghossian 2003 and Wittgenstein 1953, §219) . Regress arguments for blind reasoning are inspired by Carroll 1895. I do not endorse regress arguments for blind reasoning. But, there is a second, completely distinct argument for blind reasoning. The argument is simple, but Valaris and others miss it because they focus too much attention on Modus Ponens, ignoring other elementary forms of reasoning.
To introduce the argument, consider how we know this material conditional: if the Liar is and is not true, then I'm a monkey's uncle (literally). I know this conditional, but I do not know it non-inferentially. Learning it requires some reasoning. One way to learn conditionals like this is using reasoning by ex falso quodlibet, also called explosion. Although some non-classicists reject such reasoning, it is hard to reject it, since the reasoning only involves elementary steps. A tremendous amount of what we know by reasoning, we know on the basis of bits of suppositional reasoning. Sometimes a conclusion's sole basis is a bit of suppositional reasoning, as it may in reasoning by conditional proof, or reductio ad absurdum. Sometimes the basis includes both premisses and suppositional reasoning, as it must in reasoning by cases, also called disjunction elimination. (This is how we know that the next US president will be someone rich, whether it is the Democrat or the Republican.) If we restrict our attention to pieces of reasoning that have premisses for their entire basis, then we restrict our attention to one narrow and dangerously unrepresentative class of reasoning. Valaris indicates that he wants his thesis to apply to reasoning generally. However, Valaris only considers reasoning that is based only on 1 premisses. Even if his arguments against blind reasoning look convincing when we focus only on that narrow area, the case for non-blind basic reasoning loses plausibility when we see that it cannot be generally correct.
It indeed cannot be. In reasoning toward the conclusion that I'm a monkey's uncle if the Liar is and is not true, I never form any belief about my conclusion following from anything. And on p.12, when transitioning after discussing the case of non-basic reasoning, Valaris writes: 'Our business is not done yet, however, because non-basic reasoning cannot be all the reasoning there is.' Valaris rightly appreciates the need for a general and unified account of reasoning. Could Valaris extend his stated view in a way that would allow him to give a unified and general account of reasoning? A referee suggests that Valaris might be able to do so by appealing to the notion of conditional belief, an attitude that relates a thinker to a pair of propositions, in a way that is irreducible to ordinary, unconditional belief. The suggested view says that, in reasoning by conditional proof, the basis of the inferred conditional is a conditional belief. So, could Valaris perhaps extend his main thesis in a natural way by saying that, when you reason by conditional proof, you must believe that your inferred conclusion (a conditional that you end up unconditionally believing) follows from a conditional belief you had (where this is something like a belief in the consequent, conditional on the antecedent)?
With Wedgwood (2013) , Edgington (1995) and Lewis (1976) , I do favor the inclusion of irreducibly conditional attitudes in our psychological and epistemological theories. However, conditional attitudes do not provide a resource that will allow us to extend Valaris's view to account for inferences like conditional proof or reductio. The immediate problem is this. Valaris, like many philosophers writing on these topics, takes on methodological risks by focusing largely on Modus Ponens. He is aware of this, writing: 'Of course, it is recognized that sometimes reasoning may instead reinforce an existing belief, or lead one to abandon it.
Furthermore, sometimes we reason hypothetically, i.e. without commitment to the truth either of our premisses or of our conclusion; and sometimes we trace inferential relations via schematic arguments, which lack determinate premisses or conclusion altogether. It is unlikely that any of these cases introduce significant new issues, however, so most authors do not discuss them directly. I will follow the same practice.' (p.3) Even in that list, Valaris does not mention the type of reasoning that I have discussed, reasoning toward a believed conclusion on the basis of no premiss, only a piece of suppositional reasoning. That type of reasoning does raise significant new issues and undermines Valaris's thesis.
